IntroductionRelations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban are complex and shaped by regional rivalries, security interests, border disputes, and efforts to expand political influence. For years, Pakistan supported the Taliban as an influential force in Afghanistan’s political equation. However, the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 not only failed to resolve all of Islamabad’s concerns but also exposed several long-standing disagreements.
The fundamental question is: Why has Pakistan entered into a period of tension with a government with which it maintained close relations for years? Is Islamabad merely seeking to contain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or is it pursuing the establishment of a political order in Afghanistan that safeguards its security and regional interests? More importantly, what impact will these disagreements have on Afghanistan’s political future?
To answer these questions, we must examine the genuine interests of the Pakistani state.
1. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Main Factor Behind Escalating Tensions
One of the most important factors contributing to tensions between Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban is the issue of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, commonly known as the TTP.
The TTP is an armed group fighting against the Pakistani government and its security forces. Although the group maintains ideological and historical ties with the Afghan Taliban, it is organisationally a separate entity. Since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, Pakistani officials have repeatedly alleged that TTP militants use Afghan territory to organise and carry out attacks against Pakistan.
The Afghan Taliban have rejected these allegations or disputed their scope and nature. They have consistently maintained that they do not allow Afghan territory to be used against other countries. Nevertheless, the continuation of TTP attacks and the failure of negotiations between Islamabad and Kabul to achieve a lasting solution have deepened disagreements between the two sides.
From the Pakistani government’s perspective, a government in Kabul can be considered trustworthy only if it prevents armed groups opposed to Pakistan from operating against it. However, from the Afghan Taliban’s perspective, accepting all of Islamabad’s security demands could mean restricting their political independence and even confronting forces with which they share ideological and historical ties.
Here, the fundamental contradiction becomes apparent: Pakistan seeks security along its borders, while the Afghan Taliban are reluctant to turn against forces whose ideological outlook resembles their own. This is because the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban share a common ideological foundation: the establishment of Sharia-based rule in Islamic countries.
2. The Durand Line: A Historical Wound in Relations Between the Two Countries
The Durand Line is another fundamental source of disagreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Established in 1893 between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and a representative of Britain, the line is today recognised internationally as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, long-standing disagreements persist within Afghanistan concerning its historical and political legitimacy.
Successive Afghan governments, despite differences in their positions and approaches, have had to contend with this issue. Many political and nationalist movements in Afghanistan have refused to accept the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries or have called for a reassessment of its historical status.
The Afghan Taliban have also not provided the response Pakistan expects regarding Islamabad’s demand that the issue be settled in accordance with Pakistan’s official position. This situation creates a strategic concern for Pakistan, which seeks to shield its western border from political disputes and territorial claims.
From Pakistan’s perspective, a government in Kabul that formally recognises the Durand Line as the international border between the two countries could help reduce one longstanding source of tension. Conversely, any government that leaves the issue unresolved may face pressure and mistrust in its relations with Pakistan.
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the Durand Line is intertwined with history, identity, national sentiment, and the lives of people on both sides of the border. Therefore, no lasting solution is possible without considering the rights of border communities, historical realities, and political dialogue.
3. The Taliban’s Relations with India: Another Concern for Islamabad
The third major factor contributing to tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban is the question of India.
Since the independence and partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan and India have faced serious geopolitical rivalries and security disputes. Consequently, Islamabad has consistently assessed political developments in Afghanistan and Kabul’s relations with New Delhi through the lens of its national security interests.
Over the years, the Pakistani government has sought to prevent the emergence of a political order in Afghanistan that would turn the country into India’s strategic ally or create opportunities for India to expand its influence along Pakistan’s western frontier. Pakistan would not readily accept such a development.
Despite their historical relations with Pakistan and their former dependence on it, the Afghan Taliban have sought to diversify their foreign relations in recent years. Maintaining or expanding political and economic contacts with India has been part of this effort to find regional partners and reduce international isolation.
From Islamabad’s perspective, closer relations between Kabul and New Delhi could diminish Pakistan’s traditional influence and increase its security concerns. However, establishing diplomatic or economic relations with India does not, in itself, mean that the Taliban are cooperating with Pakistan’s enemies. Similarly, Pakistan’s allegations that India supports groups opposed to Pakistan must be assessed on the basis of specific evidence.
The essential point is that the Afghan Taliban need diversified foreign relations to maintain their hold on power, while Pakistan wants these relationships not to undermine Islamabad’s strategic interests. Under current circumstances, these conflicting objectives create conditions for further disagreements.
4. What Does Pakistan Want from Afghanistan?
To understand Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, we must examine its strategic interests in several key areas.
First, Pakistan wants to ensure that Afghan territory is not used to launch armed attacks against its territory or security forces.
Second, Islamabad seeks a settlement of the Durand Line issue in accordance with its official position, along with a reduction in territorial claims from the Afghan side.
Third, Pakistan does not want Afghanistan to become a centre for the security and military influence of its regional rivals, particularly India.
Fourth, Pakistan seeks to maintain considerable influence over Afghanistan’s political affairs and wants a government in Kabul that does not disregard Pakistan’s security interests when making major decisions.
However, there is a fundamental difference between maintaining friendly relations with a neighbour and subordinating one country’s policies to another country’s demands. As an independent state, Afghanistan has the right to conduct its foreign relations according to its national interests and the will of its people, just as Pakistan has the right to be concerned about its national security.
The problem arises when either country attempts to address its security concerns through political pressure, military threats, or interference in the internal affairs of the other.
5. Will Pakistan Support Anti-Taliban Political Forces?
One of the important questions concerning Afghanistan’s future is whether Pakistan will turn towards supporting political movements and opponents of the Taliban government if its disagreements with the Taliban continue.
Historically, Pakistan has played a significant role in Afghanistan’s political developments and has supported different forces and groups at various times. For this reason, the possibility that Islamabad may seek new political and security levers of influence in Afghanistan if tensions with the Taliban escalate deserves serious consideration.
However, there is a difference between having an incentive to influence developments in Afghanistan and proving that a particular movement receives practical support. Without credible evidence, it is impossible to state with certainty that Pakistan provides financial, military, or organisational support to a specific group.
Afghanistan’s political landscape includes movements that challenge the country’s prevailing national identity, political structure, or official historical narrative through slogans such as “I am not Afghan” or through the promotion of the idea of “Khorasan”. Some of these movements have also adopted positions on the Durand Line that differ from the traditional positions of successive Afghan governments.
For example, the political positions of Latif Pedram and some supporters of ethnic federalism and Khorasanism have raised the question of recognising the Durand Line or resolving the issue on the basis of existing realities. However, a distinction must be made between the position of an individual or a particular political movement and the positions of all movements associated with Khorasanism. Furthermore, a political figure’s acceptance of the Durand Line does not, by itself, prove that Pakistan supports that individual or the movement associated with them.
From an analytical perspective, if Islamabad concludes that certain anti-Taliban movements could help establish a government more compatible with Pakistan’s security demands in the future, it may become interested in developing political relations with them.
Even if Pakistan supports some opponents of the Taliban, such support would not necessarily indicate a desire to establish a democratic, national, and independent government in Afghanistan. States generally support forces whose objectives align with their interests at a particular moment. When those interests change, their allies may change as well.
Therefore, anti-Taliban movements must distinguish between a foreign power’s tactical use of their opposition to the Taliban and genuine support for the realisation of their political objectives.
6. Why Is Pakistan’s Role Important in Afghanistan’s Future?
Pakistan’s importance in Afghanistan’s future cannot be ignored. The two countries share a long border, and the security, economic, and political developments of each country affect the other. Trade routes, population movements, the refugee issue, the activities of armed groups, and competition among regional powers all influence relations between Kabul and Islamabad.
Pakistan can play a constructive role in Afghanistan’s stability through diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, and security agreements. Conversely, a policy of coercion, interference in domestic political rivalries, and the use of proxy groups can prolong Afghanistan’s crisis.
Furthermore, any change in relations between Pakistan and the Taliban may affect the calculations of other powers, including India, China, Iran, Russia, and the countries of Central Asia. For this reason, Afghanistan’s political future cannot be examined separately from regional rivalries.
The most important point, however, is that Pakistan’s influential role must not be confused with the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny. Lasting stability can be achieved only when relations between the two countries are based on mutual respect, non-interference, and shared interests.
7. Conclusion: Afghanistan’s Future Must Not Become a Hostage to Regional Rivalries
The current disagreements between Pakistan and the Taliban demonstrate that ideological ties and past cooperation do not guarantee a permanent alliance between states and political movements. The issue of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, disagreements over the Durand Line, and Islamabad’s concerns about the expansion of the Taliban’s relations with India constitute three major sources of these tensions.
Pakistan wants an Afghanistan from whose territory no threat to Pakistan’s security emerges and whose foreign relations do not challenge Islamabad’s strategic interests. The Taliban, despite their need for relations with Pakistan, are also attempting to preserve their political independence and maintain relations with other regional powers. This conflict of interests may lead to further political pressure and changes in Pakistan’s strategic calculations in the future.
The fundamental question is whether the people of Afghanistan will be able to break free from the cycle of dependence, foreign interference, and rivalry between proxy forces.
Afghanistan needs an independent and accountable political order grounded in the will of its people. Such an order must not become an instrument of Pakistan’s policies, fall victim to the rivalries between India and other regional powers, or allow the destiny of its people to be determined through behind-the-scenes deals.
Pakistan will continue to play an important role in Afghanistan’s future. However, the ultimate decision-makers regarding that future must be the people of Afghanistan—not foreign governments and not groups whose political survival depends on external support.
Aslan Amiri